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Abstract 
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a threat to many modern cryptosystems. Many 
countermeasures exist, but are costly to implement and still do not provide complete 
protection against SCA. A plausible alternative is to design the cryptosystem using 
architectures that are known to leak little information about the cryptosystem’s 
operations. This research uses several common primitive architectures for the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) and assesses the susceptibility of the full AES system to side-
channel attack for various primitive configurations. A combined encryption/decryption 
core is also evaluated to determine if variation of high-level architectures affects leakage 
characteristics. These different configurations are evaluated under multiple measurement 
types and leakage models. The results show that different hardware configurations do 
impact the amount of information leaked by a device, but none of the tested 
configurations are able to prevent exploitation. 
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EFFECTS OF ARCHITECTURE ON INFORMATION LEAKAGE OF A 
HARDWARE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION 
 
I.  Introduction 
Cryptographic algorithms and devices are used in many modern services and 
devices, including cellular communications, electronic banking, and Internet services. 
This means that the security of many types of personal and classified information 
depends on the strength of the algorithm used. Most modern algorithms are peer-
reviewed so that as many weaknesses as possible are identified and reinforced. In this 
way, the algorithms themselves provide a level of security. However, side-channel 
analysis (SCA) completely bypasses the strength of modern cryptographic algorithms by 
attacking the implementation of the algorithm instead of the algorithm itself. 
SCA observes physical phenomena that emanate from a device during operations 
that use secret information such as cryptographic keys. Such phenomena include power 
consumption, electromagnetic emissions, heat, and acoustics. All of these phenomena are 
considered side channels that indirectly leak information about the internal state of a 
system. Statistical analysis of such information can determine the secret information. 
Consider a two-way radio that can encrypt and decrypt data with a pre-stored 
secret key. If an enemy were to compromise just one of these radios it could have a 
localized impact on allied combat capabilities. Copies of the device must be made to have 
a broader impact on combat operations. But without knowledge of the secret key, 
creating functionally similar devices is not possible. SCA can be used to attack this 
compromised device and ascertain the secret key. 
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 Susceptibility to SCA techniques is a problem for many sensitive operations, 
including the secure storage of data and secure communications. Thus developing devices 
resistant to these attacks is necessary for maintaining secrecy in many situations. Current 
countermeasures do not completely protect most devices and require significant 
development time and resources to implement. Determining secure design practices 
would lead to a higher degree of resistance to side-channel analysis attacks. 
 A major difficulty in protecting devices from side channel analysis is most 
countermeasures require significant development time and resources. Additionally, 
information leakage is not well understood or even consistent. Simulation and analytical 
models are not sufficient to assess a given device’s weakness to side channel attacks as 
they do not explicitly model side channel effects. Furthermore, how the internal 
architecture of a device affects its leakage characteristics is not well understood, so best 
practices for secure hardware design have not been developed. 
 The primary goal of this research is to investigate the leakage characteristics of 
several hardware design styles and propose best practices when designing hardware for 
security. A secondary goal is to develop a hardware implementation of the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) that exhibits a high resistance to side channel attacks. 
 This chapter contains a brief overview of the problem and research goals. Chapter 
2 reviews basic concepts and current literature. Chapter 3 describes the experimental 
approach, system parameters, and evaluation methodology used to accomplish the 
research goals. Chapter 4 discusses the results of the experiment and analyzes the 
findings. Chapter 5 summarizes the research findings and outlines several areas for future 
research and investigations. 
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II. Literature Review 
This chapter contains background information relevant to this effort. It is not 
meant to be a comprehensive review of related research, nor a tutorial on the basics of 
cryptography and computing sciences. Each section covers an important aspect of side 
channel analysis (SCA) that influences the decisions made during construction of the 
experiment and analysis of the results. Specifically, the role and history of SCA is 
introduced with reference to standard attacks. A formal model for information leakage is 
also introduced. Several modern attacks and countermeasures are discussed, along with 
their relative strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the structures and variants of the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are described with respect to the potential for 
information leakage. 
2.1 Background 
 This section discusses some of the fundamentals and history of SCA. SCA is 
placed within the cryptanalysis branch of cryptology. Initial techniques are discussed, and 
examples of classical attacks are given. Several fundamental principles are described. 
2.1.1 Cryptology and Side Channel Analysis 
Cryptology is the science of hiding or obscuring messages, often with a secret key 
or process. In practice, cryptology is broken into two separate fields based on the primary 
goals: cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptography designs secure cryptosystems 
(ciphers); that is, designs systems that diffuse and confuse inputs in such a way that the 
output reveals very little about the original message. This can be regarded as the 
“defensive” side of cryptology. The goal of cryptanalysis, in contrast, is to extract the 
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original message or other secret information, such as a key, from the cryptosystem. As 
such, it can be considered the “offensive” side of cryptology [StL07]. 
 Cryptanalysis as a whole refers to any technique, process, observation, or 
manipulation that enables an attacker to gain insight into secret information being used 
within the cryptosystem. There are many different approaches to attacking current and 
theoretical ciphers, but all fit into several distinct categories of weaknesses being 
exploited. 
 Algorithmic weakness: the underlying structure of the cipher does not adequately 
obscure the information, or the secret key can be determined at a rate better than 
brute force [Sch00]. Attacks in this category include linear cryptanalysis and 
differential cryptanalysis. Solutions to certain mathematical problems believed to 
be hard (such as factoring large semiprimes or discrete logs) also fall into this 
category. 
 Protocol weakness: messages relating to processing, errors, data transfer, or 
authentication reveal too much information about the secret or the internal state of 
the cryptosystem. Attacks against these weaknesses are typically observed when a 
cryptosystem is used remotely. This category also includes any attacks that 
involve the attacker intruding on some of the communications, such as man-in-
the-middle attacks. 
 Implementation weakness: the platform on which the cryptosystem is 
implemented is insecure. This type of weakness stems from oversights in the 
physical or software structure of a cryptosystem. Some examples include 
improper generation of random numbers, secret information that is stored non-
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securely in memory, and observable activity of the cryptosystem. This extends to 
side channel analysis attacks and techniques. 
While the overall security of a cryptosystem relies on careful consideration of each of 
these types of weaknesses, implementation weaknesses have emerged as the major threat 
to many modern cryptosystems. This is mainly due to the fact that unintended emissions 
of electronic devices reveal information about the internal state of the cryptosystem. 
Many cryptographic algorithms are designed with the assumption that no information 
about its internal state is observable to the outside world; knowledge of intermediate 
values, then, significantly weakens or trivializes a cryptosystem [KJJ11]. 
It is most often not possible to directly observe intermediate values, but the physical 
characteristics of a cryptosystem can be analyzed to determine likely candidates for the 
intermediate values. The first major exploitation of this type was introduced in [KJJ98], 
using observations of the current  used by a device thereby determining its secret key 
through statistical analysis. This process was later extended to electromagnetic 
observations [KJJ99, GMO11]. Many types of countermeasures have been discussed to 
defeat these and related attacks, but as of yet there is no adequate solution. 
2.1.2 Power Analysis 
 The primary principle behind SCA techniques is a device behaves differently as it 
performs different operations. This is distinct from a microcontroller performing distinct 
instructions; it refers to any changes that occur within the cryptosystem. Such activity 
includes transistors toggling, memory operations, and capacitors charging and 
discharging. As data is processed, the system behavior is correlated to this data. If this 
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correlation can be predicted, hypotheses about the secret information can be tested 
against the observed activity of the device [MOP07]. 
 
  
Power analysis is split into two primary types: simple power analysis (SPA) and 
differential power analysis (DPA). SPA determines the behavior of a cryptosystem 
through manual examination of the power traces. A famous example of SPA exploits an 
implementation of the RSA algorithm (Figure 2.1) [KJJ11]. In this example, the secret 
exponent bits can be determined as the device performs fast exponentiation. Squaring is 
part of every operation, however if the exponent bit is a 1 a multiply operation will also 
occur which uses additional resources and time, both of which are visible in the trace. 
Most times SPA will not lead to such complete information leakage, but even so it serves 
as a means of identifying regions with potentially high leakage. This is important since 
reducing the search space has a significant impact on other more computationally-
intensive techniques. 
 Differential power analysis analyzes differences between traces or sets of traces. 
The strength of differential analysis comes from its ability to eliminate the random 
variations of a trace to isolate the core signal of interest by taking the average of the 
traces for a single execution of a cryptosystem. Given enough traces and assuming the 
Figure 2.1: Simple Power Analysis Attack on RSA 
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noise follows a normal Gaussian distribution, the noise will cancel itself out and only the 
core signal will remain. This is especially useful when comparing sets of known input 
differences, as the only differences between the sets should be due solely to the 
differences in input data. This is a somewhat naïve approach to DPA, but it forms the 
basis of the matching that occurs in correlation-based DPA [KJJ11]. 
 Similar to noting variations in power consumption, electromagnetic emissions 
also leak information about the switching activity of a cryptosystem. Electromagnetic 
(EM) analysis also has simple and differential components (SEMA and DEMA, 
respectively), and the general process is the same as for power. EM signals differ from 
power signals in that there is no DC offset (low frequency) component and the signal is 
bi-polar. Electromagnetic emissions also become stronger at higher frequencies, so they 
can be more easily exploited than power against high-frequency electronics [Ris10]. 
Another difference is the collection setup: power analysis requires taking measurements 
from a primary power line to the device while electromagnetic emissions can be captured 
with a specialized probe placed over the physical location of execution. Thus power 
measurements often include the activity of other miscellaneous components, while 
electromagnetic measurements provide more localized activity. Nearly all advanced DPA 
techniques also apply to DEMA as well, so both are implied in any discussion of DPA 
throughout the remainder of this document. More advanced attacks using simultaneous 
power and EM observations substantially reduce error in attack calculations [ARR03]. 
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2.2 Formal Models 
 A formal model for information leakage generalizes the case for why and how 
information leaks in a device via the proposition of several axioms which describe 
primary assumptions about information leakage. This formal model is extended to 
analytical leakage models, which extract information from physically observable 
phenomena emitted from the device during operation. 
2.2.1 General Model 
To create attacks effective against many different types of cryptosystems, several 
underlying assumptions are used to develop appropriate attacks. In these models, 
cryptosystems are viewed as abstract computers defined as collections of special Turing 
machines that interact with each other and share a special common memory [SMY06]. 
The primary hypothesis is these computers leak information during their operation. With 
this in mind, cryptosystems conform to 5 informal axioms [MiR04]: 
1. Computation and only computation leaks information. 
2. The same computation leaks different information on different computers. 
3. The information leakage depends on the chosen measurement. 
4. The information leakage is local. 
5. All information leaked through physical observations can be efficiently 
computed from a target device’s internal configuration. 
Axiom 1 highlights the difference between data at rest and data in motion; that is, 
it is assumed that information can only be leaked when it is used in some manner of 
computation. Secrets stored within memory are assumed to be secure and cannot be 
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observed if they are not used. Axiom 2 captures the notion that the algorithm is abstract 
and leaks differently on different platforms. Axioms 3 and 4 state that the collection of 
measurements is imperfect and introduces additional randomness to the observations. 
Axiom 4 also implies that leakages are the same for a device each time the same inputs 
are given. Finally, Axiom 5 states that the information leakage is a computable function 
of the computer’s internal configuration, the chosen measurement, and other external 
randomness beyond normal control [SMY06]. These axioms do not perfectly capture the 
operations of realistic systems, but for the most part these are reasonable assumptions and 
form the basis for attack methodologies. 
With these axioms in mind, each Turing machine subcomponent of the computer 
produces a signal when invoked. The sum of these signals is the total observable signal 
for a potential attacker. As the overall state of the computer changes, variation occurs in 
the signals of each Turing machine. These variations constitute the information leakage. 
Discerning individual variations from the full signal is thus the goal for the attacker. This 
process is made more difficult in the presence of other subcomponent signal variations in 
addition to the external noise introduced as part of axioms 3 and 4 [SMY06]. Figure 2.2 
graphically depicts the formal model, where Σ represents the set of all signals, and each 
Ω represents the set of basic operations performed to query the system. Each σ is a 
distinct internal signal of s total signals.   
 
 is considered primitive element j of operation 
i for pj total primitive elements. In this case, a primitive element is defined as a logic 
gate. 
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2.2.2 Leakage Models 
 Properly attacking many types of cryptosystems depends on the ability of the 
selected leakage function to correctly identify leakages in the observations by comparing 
variations in the main signal to expected variations given knowledge of the input/output 
and a hypothesis for the secret key. From the formal model described in Section 2.2.1, 
leakage information is present in the signal, but its relative strength depends on the 
complexity of the rest of the system and the errors introduced by the measurement 
process. In a realistic system the variation occurs as part of the device’s internal structure 
and construction. Distinguishing these variations involves accurately predicting the 
activity of the registers, transistors, or other components. These predictions constitute the 
leakage model. 
 A primary model pre-computes all intermediate values of the cryptosystem given 
a hypothesis for the secret information. The Hamming weight of each value serves as the 
predictor for the signal variations. This leakage model attempts to identify instances 
where the full intermediate value is either transferred or enters an empty register (all 0s). 
Figure 2.2: Theoretical Device for Formal Model 
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Both of those situations are uncommon in optimized designs, but the model is simple and 
easy to calculate. It is more effective when used in an EM environment, as the 
emanations of bus lines are more likely to appear in the observed signals. This is often 
called a Hamming Weight model [Cob11].  
 Another common leakage model uses the expected toggling activity of registers as 
a cryptosystem’s internal state changes. The expectation is that transistors only use 
additional current when switching from one state to another. This activity can be 
predicted with a hypothesis of the new value entering the register in addition to a 
hypothesis for the value it is replacing. The two hypotheses are XORed and the Hamming 
weight of the result is used as the predictor. Since registers are very common in electronic 
cryptosystems, this model is particularly effective. It may not be feasible in many cases 
however, as it requires knowledge of the internal system structure and data flow. This 
type is referred to as a Hamming Distance or Hamming Difference model [Cob11]. 
 There are other leakage models, but it is difficult to create a model that represents 
all leakages in a device. It is also difficult to create a model that captures leakages of 
many different devices. The ability to create a proper model for a device is dependent on 
knowledge of its internal structure and operation. While Kerchoff’s principle makes it 
unlikely an attacker will have no information on a device’s underlying structure, there are 
very few instances where it is reasonable to assume that complete knowledge is available. 
Just as with the hypotheses for the intermediate values themselves, hypotheses for 
appropriate models must also be tested to best capture the information leakage. 
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2.3 Modern Attacks and Countermeasures 
 SPA and DPA are extended by a variety of statistical and probabilistic attacks  
applicable to many cryptosystems. These attacks are categorized into passive attacks and 
active (or invasive) attacks. Passive attacks operate on the observations of devices; it is 
not necessary to alter the performance of the device to execute the attack. Active attacks 
do affect the execution of the system to cause errors or force certain execution conditions. 
Such attacks include fault injection, glitching, and physical modification of the logic or 
circuit elements. Due to the cost and high degree of complexity, active attacks are not 
discussed in this document. There are many types of passive attacks that exist, but only 
the attacks used in this research are discussed in-depth. 
2.3.1 Leakage Mapping 
 A  leakage map [Cob11] is produced by performing a correlation attack on 
observations of a target cipher via a Pearson product-moment correlation process. This 
type of correlation matches the expected value of a given operation with the variations at 
each point in the observation of an encryption. The key metric for this is 
 
    
          
         
 
             
     
       
      
       
 
  
 
             (2.1) 
where each xi term is an observed value for the signal and each yi term is the expected 
value at time sample i. In practice, X is a matrix with the observed traces as rows and 
each observed sample (x) as a column. Y consists of the expected values for each stage of 
the cipher, and is arranged with the cipher stages (y) as the rows and the encryption 
submission along the columns. The resulting matrix from this calculation is a samples-
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by-stages matrix of correlation coefficients between a sample and the expected value for 
a given stage. 
The matrix returned contains correlation coefficient values in the range [-1,1]. 
These coefficients indicate the magnitude of correlation between the two random 
variables; for leakage mapping, it specifically relates the extent that the hypothesis value 
for a specific intermediate value is shown in a specific observed sample of the 
encryption. Note that strong negative correlations still imply dependence between the two 
variables, but results in a decrease in signal strength as opposed to an increase. Thus the 
absolute value of the coefficients is used in practice. Knowledge of these correlations is 
extremely helpful to an attacker, as this information can be used to determine the best 
samples to attack for a given stage of the cipher. Alternatively, a system designer can use 
this information to redesign parts of the system to leak less information, or compare 
different implementations on the basis of information leakage. A sample leakage map of 
an AES implementation is shown in Figure 2.3. A stepped sequence of high-correlation 
points is consistent with AES’s general structure, as each block of high correlation 
corresponds to a specific round of AES. In contrast, a leakage map with very little 
correlation is shown in Figure 2.4, and the coefficients appear effectively random. This is 
the ideal for a defender and the worst-case for an attacker, but correlation results can be 
improved by using additional traces. Table 2.1 contains a comparison of several 
collection scenarios, and describes the maximum allowable correlation coefficient values 
to assert Nt trace resistance of a system [Cob11]. Cobb proposes to use an α value of .1 to 
allow for brute force attacks to rectify incorrect values, while Mangerd et al suggest an α 
value of .0001 to give higher assurance that the full key is correct. 
14 
  
 
 
 
 
Nt α = .1 α = .01 α = .001 α = .0001 
1000 .0573 .1038 .1375 .1650 
10,000 .0181 .0329 .0437 .0526 
100,000 .0057 .0104 .0138 .0166 
1M .0018 .0033 .0044 .0053 
1B .0006 .0010 .0014 .0017 
10B .0002 .0003 .0004 .0005 
 
2.3.2 Template Attacks 
 Chari et al introduced the concept of template attacks in [CRR02], and [ReO04] 
developed a practical methodology to utilize the attacks. Template attacks assume that a 
suitable model for a target device can be built, such that only a limited number of 
observations on an actual target are needed in order to retrieve the secret key. This 
changes the attack approach to distinct training and attack phases. The training phase 
builds templates for different key and plaintext values on a device similar to the target 
device; in this case, a template consists of a vector of means for each observed time 
Figure 2.3: Leakage Map of a Software 
AES Implementation with High 
Correlations 
Figure 2.4: Leakage Map of a Software 
AES Implementation with Poor 
Correlations 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Required Correlation 
Coefficients to Assert DPA Resistance 
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sample and a covariance matrix for each point. This covariance matrix captures the linear 
dependence between noise vectors for the given operation conditions; specifically, it 
models the noise probability distribution. A perfect model would evaluate all possible 
combinations of keys, but this is highly impractical since it is at least as intensive as 
brute-forcing the secret key. Thus in practice only a small subset of templates are used, 
but models become more accurate with additional templates. Templates can also be made 
more efficiently through trial classifications on the same training device [ReO04]. 
 The attack phase takes traces from the actual device under attack and attempts to 
fit them to the available templates by computing noise vectors for each template and 
determining the probabilities that the observed trace is statistically the same as the 
template. In an ideal case, the template would directly relate to the key. However, this 
classification process is computationally intensive in practice, and the available key 
spaces make it infeasible to completely search in a reasonable time. Thus an extend and 
prune strategy to narrow the search space to only those candidates with the highest 
likelihood of matching the observed key is used [CRR02]. The templates can also be 
made more efficient by limiting the number of samples examined in the matching 
process. Determining which samples are most suitable for attack can be done through 
principal component analysis [ReO04], or through attacks such as leakage mapping that 
reveal which samples leak the most information [Cob11]. From an information-theoretic 
perspective, template attacks represent the strongest type of side-channel attack 
[SMY06]. In practice template attacks are extremely powerful, but depend entirely on the 
quality of the available templates. 
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2.3.3 Countermeasures 
 Prevention of SCA attacks is an open problem and a substantial amount of 
research is devoted to developing countermeasures. A very basic preventative approach is 
to either increase the amount of random noise in the system or decrease the power of the 
vulnerable signals. For most attacks this simply increases the number of traces required to 
successfully retrieve the key, but the exploitable leakages still exist [Cob11]. 
Asynchronous clocking or randomized clock periods also fall into this category, such that 
the same operations occur at different times in collected traces [FMP03]. 
 A popular countermeasure uses masking or blinding to separate sensitive 
information from any physically observable information. Masking randomizes sensitive 
intermediate values by employing a secret sharing technique [CJR99]. In this way, 
information about the intermediate values is still leaked, but the intermediate values are 
independent of the secret key. Incorporating masking into many modern ciphers requires 
significant modification to the algorithm or hardware to properly handle the new 
intermediate values. Even then, masking is still susceptible to high-order differential 
[PRB09] and template attacks [OsM07]. 
 Another type of countermeasure keeps observed power and EM emissions 
constant such that the variations in the signals can no longer be exploited. This can be 
done at the transistor [TAV02] or gate [TiV04] levels of hardware design for a 
cryptosystem, with transistor-level approaches generally having a higher degree of 
success but are much more difficult to implement. Either strategy attempts to utilize dual-
rail logic such that for every intermediate bit within a cryptosystem, an exact complement 
to that bit also occurs. In this way, every possible data-dependent operation within a 
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cryptosystem theoretically requires an equivalent power draw. In practice, small 
differences in gate timings and capacitances still leak valuable information, although the 
devices are much more difficult to attack [SuS06, MPG05]. The combination of dual-rail 
logic and some other countermeasures, such as masking, has been shown to be insecure 
[ScT07]. 
2.4 Advanced Encryption Standard 
 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) selection process began in 1997 with 
the goal of establishing a new cipher to replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES). An 
important part of the process was that all ciphers submitted as candidates were open to 
the public, allowing for a wide examination by cryptographers worldwide. The Rijndael 
cipher was selected as the final candidate in 2000 [Fip01]. AES and Rijndael are thus 
treated as synonymous throughout this document. AES is widely used in modern systems 
and is approved for securing classified information by the NSA [Nsa03]. 
2.4.1 General Structure 
 AES is a block cipher capable of handling 128 and 256 bit block sizes with key 
sizes of 128, 192, or 256 bits. It is not a feistel cipher; a separate decryption process is 
required to decrypt ciphertexts [Fip01]. A variety of operational modes are available 
depending on the type of data being encrypted. Electronic Codebook (ECB) is the most 
common mode used in practice and operates on each block submitted to the system 
independently. Counter (CTR) and Ciphertext Block Chain (CBC) modes are also used, 
and each introduce some new element to the input block before being processed by the 
cipher. These modes introduce dependencies on previous data the cipher has processed so  
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plaintexts do not directly map to ciphertexts. Use of these modes requires extra measures 
to preserve proper ordering of the data. 
 The AES algorithm itself is an arrangement of multiple rounds depending on the 
block and key sizes. AES-128 uses block and key sizes of 128 bits, and are used as the 
basis for all further discussion in this document. In this configuration, AES proceeds 
through 10 rounds of primitives to diffuse and confuse the input plaintext block to a 
corresponding ciphertext block. A unique round key is generated for each round from the 
initial full key through the Rijndael key schedule process, but this is not discussed in this 
document. The plaintext and key bytes are arranged in a 4x4 column-major matrix for the 
purposes of the cipher; each intermediate state is arranged this way as well [Fip01].  
 
  
The rounds themselves are composed of four unique primitives, with the 
exception of the final round which only has 3 of the primitives. The first primitive is 
called the SubBytes (SB) step (Figure 2.5) [Wik12], which performs a non-linear 
transformation of the input bytes. Next ShiftRows (SR) is applied (Figure 2.6) [Wik12] to 
the rows of the state matrix to diffuse the data. MixColumns (MC) is the third stage 
(Figure 2.7) [Wik12], which interprets each element of the columns of the state matrix as 
part of a polynomial expression. The final step is AddRoundKey (ARK) (Figure 2.8) 
Figure 2.5: SubBytes Stage of AES Figure 2.6: ShiftRows Stage of AES  
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[Wik12], which XORs the current state matrix with the current round key. The full AES 
process is illustrated in Figure 2.9. The construction of these primitives is discussed 
further the following section. 
 
  
Figure 2.9: General Structure of AES-128 
Figure 2.7: MixColumns Stage of AES Figure 2.8: AddRoundKey Stage of AES  
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2.4.2 Primitive Architectures 
 Each individual primitive can beimplemented in a number of different ways 
depending on the application and platform. For the purposes of this research, only 
hardware construction styles are discussed. To that extent, both the ShiftRows and 
AddRoundKey stages are extremely simple in hardware. ShiftRows simplifies to byte 
routing and AddRoundKey is a block-wide XOR [RSD06]. Both of these operations are 
very straightforward and additional computation styles introduce unnecessary 
complexity. Thus the alternate styles are not discussed. Additionally, no decryption 
architectures are discussed. 
 SubBytes, at its core, transforms the input byte into its multiplicative inverse 
under GF(2
8
) and applies an affine cipher to it. Calculation of the multiplicative inverse is 
done using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm or other methods. Application of the affine 
cipher simplifies to the linear equation 
 
 
 
          
 (2.2) 
where x is the bit vector of the multiplicative inverse. Calculating both the multiplicative 
inverse and the affine transformation for every byte is a time-consuming process, so often 
the values are pre-calculated and stored in a look-up table (LUT). LUTs provide constant 
access time and are very simple to implement, but require additional logic or memory for 
storing the pre-computed values [RSD06]. There are many other computation methods 
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but nearly all of them are extensions of the input mapping (LUT) and direct calculation 
(composite field arithmetic) styles. Some examples include [MoS02] and [SRQ03]. Only 
the archetypical styles are used for this research. 
 MixColumns performs a linear multiplication of each column in the AES state 
matrix, or 
 
 
              
(2.3) 
This can be simplified to  
                                           (2.4) 
which requires only one multiplication [RSD06, LiF05]. In 2.4, each A represents one of 
the input bytes, and B represents the corresponding output byte. This is simply 
multiplication under GF(2
8
), which is a complex operation different from normal 
multiplication. Since the multiplication only uses a factor of 2, the multiplication can be 
performed by a left bit shift with a conditional check for byte overflow. If the byte does 
overflow, an XOR of 0x1B is applied to the result of the shift. Alternatively, all possible 
values for the Galois multiply can be pre-computed and stored as a LUT, similar to 
SubBytes. This again leads to two primary archetypes: input mapping and direct 
calculation. 
A special primitive combines the SubBytes and MixColumns stages into a single 
stage, called a TBox [MoS02, KaA10]. Through a re-organization of the stages such that 
ShiftRows is applied first and the transformations for SubBytes and MixColumns occur 
immediately thereafter in order. In hardware, this amounts to LUTs to transform the input 
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bytes (SubBytes) as well as a separate set of LUTs to transform the input bytes directly 
into the product of their SubBytes transformation and 2 or 3 under GF(2
8
). All of these 
values are used in XOR chains to compute the final correct value that would normally 
emerge from an equivalent MixColumns stage. 
2.4.3 High-Level Architectures 
 The construction of an AES cryptosystem is flexible so long as it produces 
ciphertexts consistent with the original algorithm description. The higher-level design of 
the cryptosystem determines the overall dataflow, as well as its operating characteristics 
(such as power consumption and throughput). Several common architectures are used in 
practice depending on the requirements and restrictions of the overall device. Note there 
are many other architectures for both the high-level flow and the primitives, but the types 
discussed in this document represent the major archetypes and most other styles can be 
classified as derivatives. 
 The first major architecture follows an iterative dataflow. This architecture re-
uses resources at the cost of overall throughput. This can be done a number of ways for 
AES. Figure 2.10 illustrates an iterative architecture with round-based iterations. A finite-
state machine can also be used to direct the dataflow to appropriate hardware as required 
by the AES algorithm. However, since available resources are limited, the throughput is 
also limited. Most iterative architectures can only operate on a single block of plaintext; 
that is, it must completely finish processing the block before another can be submitted 
[RSD06]. 
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A pipelined or fully-unrolled architecture is an alternative to an iterative 
architecture. A pipelined solution provides distinct hardware for every stage of AES with 
specific registers between each stage [SRQ03]. This allows the system to simultaneously 
process as many plaintext blocks as there are stages, and produces one ciphertext every 
clock cycle in steady state. This is very advantageous for increasing throughput, but the 
resource costs are considerable. An example of a pipelined AES structure is presented in 
Figure 2.11. 
 
  
Figure 2.10: Iterative Architecture for AES.  
Figure 2.11: Pipelined Architecture for AES.  
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The final architecture considered combines the encryption and decryption 
datapaths into a single cryptosystem by having the initial plaintext follow both the 
encryption and decryption datapaths. A multiplexer is used at the end of each round to 
determine whether the encryption or decryption datapath inputs are used in the following 
round. This architecture is preferable in situations where both encryption and decryption 
capabilities are required in the same system. This can be implemented in either an 
iterative or pipelined style. The decryption primitives are entirely different structures 
from their encryption counterparts so very little between them can be re-used. However, 
if the SubBytes stage is split into separate multiplicative inverse and affine cipher steps, 
then the multiplicative inverse hardware can be re-used between both datapaths [RSD06]. 
In this case, the multiplexer is instead placed before the inverse step as shown in Figure 
2.12. 
 
 
 
2.4.4 Susceptibility to SCA 
 Many different AES implementations have been shown to be weak against SCA 
techniques [SOP04, MaS06, RSV09]. The information that leaks varies by the system, 
but secret keys can be fairly easily recovered on unprotected systems. Protections are the  
most common countermeasure added to the system, but research into secure architectures 
Figure 2.12: Combined EN/DE Core for AES.  
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has been limited. In software, proper secure design practice necessitates building security 
into the core of the design and not simply adding in security measures after the design is 
finished [SaS75]. This also holds for hardware security. Much of the research into 
alternate AES architectures have focused on efficiency and performance metrics 
[SRQ03], but very little has been examined as to the relative resistance of different 
architectures to SCA. 
 Standaert et al. investigate the effects of pipelining AES against SCA in [SOP04]. 
The theory and results showed that pipelining itself does not serve as an adequate 
protection, but any increase in the number of simultaneous processing elements increases 
the overall noise within the system thus making the system more difficult to attack. This 
is in line with the formal model for cryptosystems discussed in Section 2.2.1. Thus, while 
pipelining is not a complete countermeasure, it may provide additional protection through 
noise generation. 
2.5 Summary 
 SCA has emerged as a major threat to many modern cryptosystems by attacking 
physically observable phenomena during the processing of secret information within a 
cryptosystem. Formal models of information leakage extend to leakage functions that 
capture the information within the full signal. This can be done through manual 
comparison of traces, correlation attacks, and template attacks. Countermeasures such as 
masking, asynchronous clocking, and dual-rail logic styles have been introduced to 
combat these leakages, but none have been completely successful in eliminating 
information leakage. 
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 The structure of an AES-based cryptosystem varies in terms of its primitive and 
high-level architectures. Each different architecture produces the same output data, but 
different operations occur on the input data. Limited research has been done to 
investigate how different architectural styles affect information leakage. Using different 
architectures is likely to affect the magnitude of information leakage, but it is unclear 
whether this difference itself can be considered a countermeasure. 
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III. Methodology 
This chapter describes the process used to achieve and evaluate the research 
goals. The problem is clearly defined, and limits are placed on the scope of evaluations. 
Parameters and factors are discussed with reference to their effect on the system. An 
experimental setup is described with specific details relating to equipment and the 
measurement process. Evaluation metrics are also selected. Finally, the experiment is 
justified within the bounds of its expected results and the goals of the research. 
3.1 Problem Definition 
 This section describes the higher-level goals and approach for this research. The 
hypotheses and general problem are defined to motivate design decisions in the 
formulation of the experiments. The overall approach of the experiment is presented so 
that the experimental tasks can be correctly interpreted. 
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
The primary goal of this research is to determine the effectiveness of a FPGA-
based AES implementation designed to be resistant to side-channel attacks. The main 
premise is that countermeasures to side-channel attack aside, there are certain designs 
that leak less information through physically observable phenomena. That is, it is 
presumed the underlying architecture of the algorithm can significantly affect its 
emission characteristics. Analyzing any remaining leakage can then be used to develop 
specific countermeasures to further enhance a device’s security. 
 The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is an effective way to characterize how prone a 
system is to exploitation. The goal is to make this value as low as possible, which in 
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general can be accomplished by lowering the signal strength or increasing the noise. This 
is significant for side-channel attacks in that a doubling of noise squares the number of 
traces needed to successfully attack the system [Sch00]. Different hardware 
configurations generate different amounts of full-system noise and target signal strength, 
so it is advantageous to approach the problem from this viewpoint. 
 For hardware systems, changing the architecture results in different configurations 
of the transistors and thus different power and electromagnetic signatures. These are the 
signals most commonly exploited in side-channel attacks. Thus, a primary goal is to 
determine the best configurations of AES primitive elements that limit the vulnerability 
of those signals. The secondary goal is to determine whether or not this reduction in 
information leakage is sufficient to prevent an attacker from extracting secret 
information. The overall best configuration is expected to be a simple hardware 
configuration due to the simplicity of the logical operations resulting in a smaller 
electrical footprint. This hypothesis is thoroughly tested over the course of the 
experiments. 
3.1.2 Approach 
 To determine the effectiveness of a SCA-resistant AES configuration, this 
research performs correlation attacks against each configuration and observes the 
resulting magnitude of information leakage. The different configurations include different 
hardware architectures for the Substitute Bytes (SB) and Mix Columns (MC) stages of 
AES, as described in Section 2.4.2. The remaining stages are not considered because their 
default configuration is logically simple, consisting of only basic digital logic blocks such 
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as XORs or wire routing. All designs are compared in terms of the magnitude and variety 
of information leaked. 
 Leakage maps [Cob11] are used to assess the correlation of each time sample to 
each expected intermediate value which are calculated with full knowledge of the secret 
key to examine the scenario in which the attacker correctly guesses the corresponding 
bits and bytes; that is, the worst-case scenario for a defender is assessed. Both power 
draw and electromagnetic emissions are observed and processed with Hamming Weight 
and Hamming Distance leakage models. The Hamming Distance model is created with 
full knowledge of the underlying architecture, again assuming the worst-case scenario for 
the defender. 
3.1.3 Adversarial Context 
To specify the bounds of how the device can be attacked, a proper attack scenario 
must be established. It is assumed that the targeted device is in constant operation and 
cannot be removed or replaced by the attacker without alerting the operators. The attacker 
has obtained a prior piece of encrypted data encrypted by the target device, and his goal 
is to obtain the secret key so that the information can be decrypted. The input and output 
of device can be observed at any given time, and the attacker can observe 
electromagnetic emissions and power consumption of the device. 
To summarize, the attacker cannot physically alter or disrupt the operation of the 
device. This means that invasive attacks cannot be performed. He does not have the 
ability to select plaintexts (cannot perform chosen plaintext attacks), nor can he control 
the rate at which encryption requests are sent to the system. Finally, the attacker has 
complete knowledge of the plaintext/ciphertext pairs. From an information-theoretic 
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standpoint this means that the key can be determined, although it is infeasible to calculate 
given finite time and resources. 
3.3 System Boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT) is the AES Memory Interface. This includes the 
hardware implementation of AES itself, its interaction with Random Access Memory 
(RAM), and the FPGA that serves as the execution platform. The focus of this 
experiment is the AES implementation; that is, it is the primary Component Under Test 
(CUT). The RAM blocks and FPGA are left as generic devices; that is, no FPGA device-
specific features are used that would prevent an equivalent implementation from being 
realized on a different brand or model FPGA. The AES implementation is limited to a 
128-bit Electronic Codebook (ECB) variant. While there are many AES operating modes 
and key lengths, this variant is the most suitable for parallelization. Additionally, it is the 
most common operating mode in practice. 
Figure 3.1 shows the full SUT with its workload, parameters, metrics, and 
responses. Although the CUT is the AES implementation, it is not its functionality being 
tested; that is, its throughput, area, power consumption, and similar characteristics. 
Instead, the intrinsic factors such as electromagnetic emissions and current draw during 
operation are tested. Note that in the context of this experiment the RAM is only notional; 
the actual storage of the ciphertexts is not important in the evaluation of the CUT, as it is 
considered data at rest and is therefore outside the scope of the attack. 
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Figure 3.1: AES Memory Interface 
3.4 System Services 
This system provides encryption, storage, and decryption of data. Each of these 
functions is a service of the system. Encryption simply takes plaintext and applies the 
AES algorithm to it, which produces ciphertext that can only be feasibly recovered with 
knowledge of the secret key used to transform it. This encrypted data is saved to blocks 
of RAM and can be recalled for subsequent decryption. This interaction with memory is 
controlled by the target address space for both encryption and decryption services. 
Decryption takes ciphertext and converts it to plaintext based on the secret key. Within 
the system itself, this is performed by taking the data stored in memory at the target 
address, running it through the AES algorithm, and returning the plaintext to the user or 
other systems. 
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The system does not provide authentication, which would validate the 
encryption/decryption requests. Without authentication, any and all requests made to the 
system are executed. This enables an attacker with access to the device to decrypt the 
stored data or overwrite it if the key is pre-stored on the device. Another service not 
present in the system is data integrity. Bits may be corrupted in rare cases due to 
excessive noise or attacks on the system causing encryption or decryption services to 
produce incorrect results and possibly leak more information about the key. No service 
checks whether bytes are altered when performing the other services. Both authentication 
and integrity verification are outside the scope of this experiment. 
3.5 Workload 
The primary workload submitted to the SUT is random plaintext queued for 
encryption. This plaintext is transformed into ciphertext and stored in the RAM. The 
stored ciphertext can be recalled and decrypted as well, but the encryption and decryption 
processes are not run simultaneously. Plaintext is required to be sufficiently random to 
draw correlations between the bits, bytes, or words as they travel through the system. The 
secret key is fixed for individual sessions of workload submission, but it is not required to 
be fixed for distinct workload submissions. Even so, the primary key is not changed 
throughout these experiments as there is no immediate benefit of varying the key for this 
research. 
Requests to the system are comprised of the plaintext to encrypt and the desired 
operation. Alternate operations include setting a new secret key and simultaneous 
submission of a new key and plaintext. Setting a new key completely overwrites the prior 
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key. Decryption requests and operations are not considered in this research. Random 
plaintexts are initially generated by a seeded linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Once 
the system produces a ciphertext, that ciphertext is fed back to the system as plaintext in 
place of the LFSR plaintexts to produce plaintexts fast enough to keep the system under 
full load while still allowing each plaintext to be reproducible. 
3.6 Performance Metrics  
Correlation-based DPA attacks relate the overall correlation of expected variations to 
observed variations. Leakage maps are a collection of the correlations for each state of a 
cryptosystem against each observed sample of an encryption. These maps are useful in 
determining locations of information leakage for each stage of a cryptographic algorithm, 
but can also be used to assess the system’s actual susceptibility to correlation attack. 
Maps for both power draw and electromagnetic emission measurements are analyzed 
using the Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models described in Section 
2.2.2. Results are deemed to be significant if 0.0 is not within the confidence interval of 
the correlation coefficient. The confidence interval for N traces and 1-α confidence is 
 
     
   
 
 
      
    
  
   
   
 
 
      
    
  
   
  
 
 
(3.1) 
This value can also be interpreted as the maximum observed correlation coefficient to 
assert N-trace resistance to DPA [Cob11]. 
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Leakage maps are assessed in terms of the maximum correlation coefficients 
observed across the individual primitives with a focus on the rounds and stages most 
susceptible to attack. Both individual bits and bytes are examined in this way. The 
minimum, maximum, and average maximum correlations for each stage are reported. 
Additionally, the magnitude of the average maximum leakages are assessed in terms of 
the likelihood those samples can be exploited in a correlation attack. Table 3.1 lists the 
maximum observable correlation coefficients to assert SCA resistance for 1,000,000 
traces with an accompanying statement of likelihood based on (3.1). These are meant to 
provide a general idea of the significance for each confidence level given the sample size 
of 69,700 correlation coefficients calculated for each leakage map. 
 
 
Confidence Level Maximum observed correlation Assessment 
90% .0018 No exploitable correlations. 
99% .0033 Weak correlations. 
99.9% .0044 Moderate correlations. 
99.99% .0053 High correlations. 
99.99%+ >.0053 Exploitable correlations. 
3.7 System Parameters 
A number of parameters affect performance of the SUT from the viewpoint of the 
goals of this research. The most prominent parameters are described below, as well as 
assumptions being made about those parameters. 
 
Secret Key – Using a different secret key within the system results in different 
interactions between the input plaintexts and the intermediate hardware. This effect is not 
expected to have a large impact on the results, but different keys have the potential for 
Table 3.1: Correlation Confidence 
Assessments 
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weakness in different bits and bytes. The secret key is kept constant throughout all 
experiments so that results are directly comparable. 
System Clock – For any system based on transistors and digital circuits, the system clock 
plays a role in synchronizing the components and data flow. However, the characteristics 
of transistors can behave differently at different clock speeds. For example, higher clock 
speeds put more strain on the electronics to the point where may behave erratically. A 
varying clock speed would affect some of the EM or power analyses, and thus is kept 
constant throughout all experiments. 
System Voltage – Similar to the system clock, adjusting the input voltage level of a 
circuit puts additional strain on the transistors, and changes its observable characteristics. 
In particular, increasing the voltage for a digital circuit results in higher EM emissions 
and a more powerful signal. Input voltage is kept constant for all experiments. 
Temperature – Temperatures, both ambient and circuit-produced, affect how electrons 
flow within the circuit. Increases in temperature can result in a significant reduction in 
circuit performance, and further affect its outward characteristics. Ambient temperature is 
kept roughly constant by keeping consistent laboratory environments during 
measurements. 
Ambient Noise – Noise strongly affects measurements by changing the total SNR. 
Introduction of excessive ambient noise can result in misleading interpretations of the 
measurement data. Such noise is kept relatively constant by performing the 
measurements in a laboratory environment. Additionally, most ambient noise is expected 
to be eliminated through the correlation calculations. 
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AES Primitives – For this effort in particular, the selection of AES primitives has a large 
effect on the resulting signal strength and system-generated noise. Using different 
hardware configurations for the primitives allows variation of the system’s outward 
characteristics, as well as affecting its throughput performance. 
System Architecture – This parameter is the system’s high-level architecture, specifically 
its circuit complexity or length of pipeline. Altering this parameter affects the observable 
circuit characteristics as well as the performance, much in the same way as the AES 
primitives. The system uses a fully-unrolled pipeline configuration for all experiments, 
with full byte-level parallelism for each AES stage. 
System Load – The system’s relative loading at the time of measurement affects its 
outward characteristics significantly. For a pipelined system, a system under full load 
would be one in which data was currently being processed in all stages of the pipeline. 
Since the attacker has no control over the rate of encryption requests, the system is placed 
under full load during testing. 
3.8 Factors 
The previous section described all system parameters, but only a few of the 
parameters are varied over the course of this experiment. These factors are discussed in 
greater detail below. The different levels are succinctly described in Table 3.2. 
AES Primitives – Primitives form the low-level architecture of the system and describe 
the transformation of the input to the necessary output. The transformation process for 
certain primitives can be performed in myriad ways, however, and that forms the main 
source of variation for this factor. These different hardware configurations are expected 
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to alter the resulting characteristics of side-channel leakages depending on which are 
implemented. Specifically, the SB primitive is examined in LUT and composite field 
arithmetic configurations, and the MC primitive is checked between its LUT and Galois 
multiplication configurations. Each combination of these primitives is tested for its 
effectiveness in reducing information leakage. 
System Architecture – This factor refers to the higher-level structure of how the 
primitives interact with one another. Typical configurations are either iterative or 
pipelined. This factor is varied between a simple fully-unrolled architecture and a more 
complex combined encryption and decryption style. The difference between these two 
architectures is the presence of additional hardware components in the combined style; 
these additional primitives still operate on intermediate data and are expected to generate 
additional system noise. This factor is varied in a secondary phase of the experiment after 
the best primitive types have been determined. 
Table 3.2: Factors and Levels 
Phase Factor Levels 
1 SubstituteBytes Style {Look-up Table, Composite Field Arithmetic} 
1 MixColumns Style {Look-up Table, Galois Multiplication } 
2 High-Level Architecture {Standard Pipelined, Combined EN/DE Pipelined} 
 
 This experiment initially intended to cover additional factor levels, including 
TBox styles for the SB and MC primitives and an iterative high-level architecture. The 
code and interfaces for these devices have been created, and simulations show that these 
other architectures operate as expected. However, implementations of these designs 
produce invalid results due to hardware synthesis errors (likely due to the synthesis 
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engine used). These errors could not be fixed as of the writing of this document, and thus 
those configurations are excluded from the experiment. 
3.9 Evaluation Technique 
The most suitable evaluation technique for these experiments is the direct 
measurement of a real system. Simulated or analytical models are not suitable since the 
underlying electrical properties of the digital circuit would be much more difficult to 
model vice simply implementing and measuring the circuit. 
Measurements are obtained using the Riscure EM probe and an attached oscilloscope. 
Both EM and power traces are taken simultaneously, with 1 million encryptions observed 
per experimental configuration. A SASEBO GII FPGA with a Xilinx Virtex 5 core is the 
execution platform. Configurations are varied according to the levels and listed in Table 
3.2. The collection process is triggered via a hardware cue programmed into the system. 
These initial measurements are sampled at 5 gigasamples per second to account for 
internal processes occurring at up to 2500 MHz, however the FPGA is only clocked at 
100 MHz. The initial seed and request is sent to the system over through a UART (serial) 
connection. New measurements are taken for each new configuration. Several pilot 
measurements are also done on configurations to properly set up analysis tools, but are 
not used towards the full trace sets of those configurations. 
Measurements are validated through simple power/EM analysis techniques including 
averaging, bit correlation, and noise filtration. The goal for this type of validation is to 
ensure that the data is consistent over the course of trace collection. The correctness of an 
AES core is verified by comparing the generated plaintexts/ciphertexts against known 
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good plaintext/ciphertext pairs. These correct pairs are obtained from the implementation 
in the AESObject MATLAB library, which is distributed as part of the OpenSCA 
toolbox. 
3.10 Experimental Design 
 The experiment is a full factorial design in two phases. Testing in this manner 
leads to the best overall design in terms of SCA-resistance, as well as allows some insight 
into why certain designs leak less than others. This results in only 5 total experiments; 4 
in phase 1 to select the best configuration of primitives, and one additional experiment in 
phase 2 to test the effects of other high-level architectures. Each of the experiments is 
measured in two distinct ways, and each type of measurement is analyzed with two 
distinct leakage models. This leads to four distinct analyses for each experiment, resulting 
in 20 total analyses. 
 Variance in the resulting maximum correlation coefficients is handled according 
to the assessment proposed in Table 3.1. Analyses that show moderate to high 
correlations are potentially exploitable, and maximum correlation coefficients above that 
range are considered to be weak to SCA attacks. Replications of the experiments are not 
performed because it is assumed that errors due to environmental noise are negligible 
after the correlation process. A confidence interval of 99% is used in determining 
statistical significance of results from t-tests. 
3.11 Methodology Summary 
 The primary approach in this effort is a full evaluation of suitable AES primitives 
followed by an examination of differences due to high-level structure. This provides 
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direct insight into the effects of each primitive as well as their interactions across 
common measurement types and leakage models. Varying the high-level architecture 
reveals whether different design styles at that level have a meaningful impact on 
information leakage. The end result indicates which primitive implementations and 
architectural styles have the best security characteristics, as well as describe the relative 
security of the full AES system. 
 While many other parameters affect the electrical characteristics of the system, 
factors are limited to the architectural decisions since those are the factors that can be 
enforced on all such devices based on them. The remaining parameters are left to the 
attacker’s discretion and cannot be controlled once the device is released. 
 The analyses of these results provide further insight into best practice of 
architectural style for low- and high-level views of a system when the goal is resistance 
against side-channel attack. These results are not limited to the AES algorithm and its 
implementations but also apply to a broad range of cryptographic and communication 
devices. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 This section performs a systematic analysis of the experimental results. The 
results are analyzed at several different levels, starting with bit leakages and continuing to 
byte and full leakage analyses. Each level is analyzed based on the maximum points of 
information leakage between the different primitives, individual rounds, and leakage 
models. Each stage of analysis explores both the power and electromagnetic leakages. 
Note that configurations are abbreviated according to the styles used for each component, 
with the SB variant listed first and the MC variant listed second. Styles implemented 
using look-up tables are abbreviated LUT, and composite field arithmetic styles are 
abbreviated GAL. Thus, LUT-GAL indicates a configuration using look-up tables for the 
SB primitive and Galois multiplication in the MC primitive. All references to the 
confidence in a given value are based on Table 3.1. Higher confidence levels give a 
higher likelihood the target sample is not a false-positive. Thus, attacking a device with a 
lower confidence level is more likely to introduce errors and increase the amount of 
brute-forcing an attacker must use to recover the secret information. 
4.1 Effects of Primitive Architecture Variation 
 This section analyzes how different configurations of the primitives affect the 
total leakage characteristics of the implementation. This analysis is performed separately 
at the bit and byte levels. The best configuration of primitives is selected based on the 
results of these analyses, and is used in the secondary phase of the experiment to 
determine the effects of high-level architecture variation. 
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4.1.1 Bit Analysis 
 An attacker desires a high correlation between the expected intermediate values 
and the observed variations in the signal. This can be done at several different levels, 
with bit correlations as the lowest and most direct level. Individual bits are attacked by 
positing a hypothesis for the bit values and analyzing how closely the observed data 
correlates to it. This works best in attacking registered data after the initial add round key 
stage, such that at most 256 hypotheses must be tested (2 for each bit in the key). More 
strenuous analysis can be used to attack later rounds of the algorithm, but the best case 
for an attacker is that the first ARK stage leaks sufficient information to attack. 
Alternatively, the final ARK stage can be attacked similarly with the ciphertext instead of 
the plaintext, but this attack can only determine the 11
th
 round key and not the full 
original key. 
 Leakage maps for individual bits on each of the architectures reveals several 
trends in the data. For the EM measurements, neither of the leakage models was able to 
capture the general structure of the algorithm for each round. Samples are shown in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Only the EM measurements processed under the HW leakage model 
showed subtle indications of the later rounds. This initial inspection shows it is likely 
unreasonable to exploit individual bits throughout the algorithm, regardless of the 
architecture. The power measurements analyzed with the HD model in Figure 4.3 
revealed a clearer view of the system structure, but was still limited for many of the bits. 
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Using each individual state bit as a separate sample, the maximum correlation 
values for individual primitives are aggregated and compared in terms of their minimum, 
maximum, and mean values. The full tables are listed in Appendix A. Across all 
architectures, leakage models, and measurement type, the most significant variations due 
to architecture were seen in the EM measurements under the HW leakage model (Figure 
4.4), and the power measurements analyzed with the HD model (Figure 4.5). The 
remaining types have only very minor variations from architectures. This is most likely 
due to the effects of additional system noise due to the architectures. A sample of this is 
Figure 4.1: EM HW Leakage Map Figure 4.2: EM HD Leakage Map 
Figure 4.3: Power HD Leakage Map 
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shown in Figure 4.6; other combinations feature similar variations. Note that all reported 
correlation values are the maximum observed coefficients for each primitive. The points 
of maximum correlation are the only points an attacker needs when attacking a system. 
Thus, references to the average case refer to the mean of the maximum values observed 
across all bits, and references to best case refer only to the absolute maximum values 
observed for each stage. 
 
  
 
 
 
Variation of the architecture affects all stages similarly under the EM HW leakage 
map, while the power HD correlations show significant variations only in the stages with 
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architecture changes. Table 4.1 lists the impact of each factor on the individual stages of 
the power HD and EM HW analyses. These values were obtained through an allocation 
of variation process. For all models and measurement types, SB and SR stages share 
equivalent values because the expected values are not actually changed between rounds 
and are merely routed to the necessary locations. Thus, SR is not listed in the results. The 
allocation of variance highlights that changing the style of one type of primitive has the 
most significant effect on that primitive’s leakage in the power HD model. It also shows 
that variation in the ARK primitive is almost equally affected by changing either of the 
primitives. This is not true for the EM HW model, as variation of the SB component 
controls the observed variation in each primitive. 
 
Power HD Factor Impact   EM HW Factor Impact 
Stage SB MC SB/MC 
 
Stage SB MC SB/MC 
ARK 46.57% 45.36% 8.07% 
 
ARK 92.72% 1.72% 5.57% 
SB 97.77% 2.02% 0.21% 
 
SB 78.53% 0.07% 21.40% 
MC 0.03% 80.15% 19.83%   MC 93.72% 1.59% 4.69% 
 
The initial and final ARK stages are the most likely to be targeted by bit-wise 
correlation attacks. Examining these stages alone reveals that both configurations with 
the GAL SB primitive reduce the leakage of the power HD and EM HW analyses for 
both ARK stages (Figures 4.7 and 4.8). Leakage is reduced by 25.35% in the power HD 
analysis and 39.75% in the EM HW analysis for the initial ARK; leakage was also 
reduced in the final ARK by 39.05% and 34.74%, respectively. Varying the MC 
architecture affected these rounds by less than 5%. This difference reduces the accuracy 
Table 4.1: Bit Allocation of Variation 
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of the attack, meaning that the measurements were only weakly correlated to the 
hypotheses. Leakage was not affected by architectures for the other types of analyses. 
 
ARK Power HD       
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 4.047E-04* 5.675E-04 7.706E-04 
LG -4.047E-04* x 1.628E-04* 3.659E-04 
GL -5.675E-04 -1.628E-04* x 2.031E-04* 
GG -7.706E-04 -3.659E-04 -2.031E-04* x 
  
   
  
SB Power HD       
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 4.602E-05* 1.336E-03 1.230E-03 
LG -4.602E-05* x 1.290E-03 1.184E-03 
GL -1.336E-03 -1.290E-03 x -1.064E-04* 
GG -1.230E-03 -1.184E-03 1.064E-04* x 
  
   
  
MC Power HD       
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 6.391E-04 1.346E-04* 3.509E-04* 
LG -6.391E-04 x -5.045E-04 -2.882E-04* 
GL -1.346E-04* 5.045E-04 x 2.163E-04 
GG -3.509E-04* 2.882E-04* -2.163E-04 x 
*- Not statistically significant within 99% confidence interval 
A student t-test is used to determine whether the estimated means between 
different configurations are statistically different. Table 4.2 lists the differences in the 
averages for the compared architectures under a power HD model where marked values 
are not statistically significant within a 99% confidence interval. The calculated p-values 
are detailed in Appendix D. These results indicate that the observed means are different 
for most configurations across the ARK and SB primitives. Notable exceptions include 
the LUT-GAL and GAL-LUT comparison for the ARK stage and the LUT-LUT and 
LUT-GAL comparison for the SB stage. Both of these cases have a limited likelihood of 
Table 4.2: Average Bit Correlation Differences by Stage 
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being different. This is supported by the allocation of variation analysis in Table 4.1; 
varying either architecture has a similar effect on ARK, while varying the SB primitive 
has a much stronger impact on the SB means. For the MC analysis this is also true, 
however the p-values for those cases are much higher compared to equivalent 
comparisons in SB. 
 
  
 
Referring to Table 3.1, the maximum observed correlation general case is weak in 
each stage within a 90% confidence interval, but not within 99% for GAL SB 
configurations. These confidence intervals relate directly to the accuracy of an attack 
where lower confidence intervals have a higher likelihood of being false-positives. This 
means that the implementations have potential weakness to correlation attacks, however 
it is likely that an attack will contain some errors and the attacker will not be able to 
obtain the complete key through the correlation attacks alone. This is supported by 
manual inspection of the leakage maps, which show spikes of high correlation at time 
samples that cannot contain information about that particular AES state (Figure 4.9). This 
applies for both the EM HW and power HD analyses, however the EM HW type exhibits 
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correlations nearly twice as strong as the power HD in the best case. Best case maximum 
values for EM HW analysis are well beyond 99.99% confidence, meaning that those bits 
are highly exploitable. The stages most likely to be exploited in a bit-level correlation 
attack are moderately weak to attack with 99% confidence. Composite field arithmetic 
SB primitives showed the best effects in lowering information leakage, while GAL MC 
primitives show mixed results depending on the type of analysis. Thus GAL SB and MC 
LUT primitives are selected as the best tested primitives at a bit analysis level. 
 
 
 Table 4.3 lists the number of bits that can be compromised for a given confidence 
level. These values assume that only a high correlation value is necessary to exploit any 
given bit, each stage and round is equally exploitable, and that every possible point of a 
leakage map is valid. Results are only shown for the GAL-LUT configuration, as that was 
selected as the best overall configuration at the bit level. With only 90% confidence, all 
bits are exploitable under the listed assumptions. This drops off with higher confidence 
Figure 4.9: Leakage Map with Inaccurate 
Correlation Spikes  
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levels, but some of the bits are still exploitable beyond 99.99% confidence, meaning that 
the target samples in those bits are highly unlikely to be false-positives. If the correct 
values of 33 bits can be learned by an attacker, the search space for a brute force attack 
on the remaining bits is reduced from 2
128
 to 2
95
. This indicates that this implementation 
is still weak to SCA at the bit level, but it is unlikely that all bits can be cleanly exploited 
in an attack. Also note that the EM HD and power HW models are ineffective at higher 
confidence levels compared to EM HW and power HD. 
 
 
 
Confidence Level 
Model 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9999 
EM HW 128 127 74 30 
EM HD 128 120 6 0 
Power HW 128 90 0 0 
Power HD 128 128 101 33 
 
4.1.2 Byte Analysis 
 Similar to bit analysis, individual bytes of the secret key can be attacked by 
forming hypotheses about their values and testing these hypotheses through correlation 
attacks. Byte correlation attacks can be more effective than bit correlation attacks since 
most AES stages operate at a byte level. Using only simple analysis, the first round can 
be exploited in each stage up to MC; more advanced analytical processes are required for 
exploiting later rounds and stages. An attacker needs to perform at most 4096 distinct 
analyses if the first round can be exploited for each byte (one for each possible byte value 
for each of the 16 bytes). 
Table 4.3: Number of Exploitable Bits per 
Confidence Level  
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 The leakage maps for the state bytes show a much clearer indication of the 
internal progression than the individual bit analysis. This likely indicates that the bytes 
are exploitable at many stages and rounds. Again, the EM signals show clearer results in 
the HW leakage model, whereas the power traces give higher correlations under the HD 
model. Unlike the bit analysis, EM measurements analyzed with the HD model also show 
some of the AES structure at the byte level. Power traces under the HW model still do not 
show any clear structure, however. Samples of the leakage maps are displayed in Figures 
4.10 and 4.11. 
   
 
The maximum values across each stage are aggregated for all 16 bytes in each 
analysis are in Appendix B. These results are visualized in Figures 4.12 and 4.13. Just as 
with the bit analysis, composite field calculation for the SB stage has a significant impact 
on the leakage from the SB and SR stages. Varying the architecture of the MC stage also 
had an effect on the average case, but the results are not as promising. Using Galois 
multiplication in the MC stage results in lower average leakages for the MC and ARK 
stages, but actually caused more leakage in the SB and SR stages. The reasoning for this 
Figure 4.11: EM HW Byte Leakage Map  Figure 4.10: Power HD Byte Leakage 
Map  
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is likely that the Galois multiplication actually creates less system-wide noise than the 
LUT variant, while the simplified operations involve less data-dependent operations. 
 
  
 
Table 4.4 lists the average maximum leakages for the first and last round 
primitives; the remaining values are in Appendix C. These rounds are the easiest to attack 
since the attacker can directly test hypotheses, and thus they are given special attention. 
Figures 4.14 and 4.15 visualize a couple of the types with fluctuations due to architecture 
choice. The GAL SB variant again has the most significant impact, reducing leakages in 
most primitives by 25.02% in Round 1 and 55.88% in round 10 under the power HD 
analysis. The EM HW analysis also showed benefits, but only 16.80% reduction in round 
1 and 37.97% in round 10. Using the GAL MC variant again has mixed results, with 
slight advantages in round 10 but higher leakage in round 1; observed effects were less 
than 10% for each primitive and analysis type. 
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Byte POW HD Arch 
  LL LG GL GG 
  Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 
ARK 0.01153 0.01095 0.01201 0.01033 0.00860 0.00492 0.00760 0.00447 
SB 0.00588 0.01096 0.00626 0.01033 0.00362 0.00493 0.00383 0.00447 
SR 0.00588 0.01096 0.00626 0.01033 0.00362 0.00493 0.00383 0.00447 
MC 0.00725   0.00679   0.00756   0.00760   
 
 
 
 
 Allocation of variation analysis and t-tests for the byte level show similar results 
as in the bit-level analysis, with a few exceptions. The most significant difference is that 
none of the tested configurations had a high probability of being different within the MC 
stage; the p-values are shown in Table 4.5. This indicates that none of the configurations 
tested provided significantly different values across the MC stage at a byte level within a 
99% confidence interval. This is contrasted with the bit level analyses, where a 
significant difference was observed when varying the MC architecture. 
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MC Power HD       
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 0.184365 0.331222 0.231752 
LG 0.184365 x 0.380402 0.581512 
GL 0.331222 0.380402 x 0.295397 
GG 0.231752 0.581512 0.295397 x 
 
All analysis methods and measurement types exhibited at least weak correlation 
in each of the primitives, regardless of architecture. The average case for power 
measurements analyzed with the HD leakage model showed the highest overall 
correlations in each stage, but the composite field arithmetic SB primitive configurations 
resulted in reductions in the total leakage. This is also true for the maximum observed 
correlations in each stage. The EM HW maximum correlation is still extremely high with 
values above .008, which indicates that at least some of the bytes are exploitable. 
Composite field arithmetic SB configurations exhibit correlations above .0053 (above 
99.99% confidence threshold) in the power measurements under the HD model, meaning 
that at least some of the bytes are exploitable under this model. Rounds 1 and 10 in 
particular are within only 99% confidence, meaning that moderate correlation exists for 
the rounds that are most likely to be exploited and an attacker is likely to use false-
positives when attacking these rounds. 
 Again using the same assumptions listed in the bit level summary, the number of 
exploitable bytes for given confidence levels in the GAL-LUT configuration are listed in 
Table 4.6. All 16 bytes are exploitable across all confidence levels under the power HD 
analysis. This means that an attacker can compromise all bytes of the secret key, even 
Table 4.5: Power HD MC t-Test p-Values  
54 
with the best tested configuration. 15 of the bytes can also be compromised for EM 
measurements, meaning that this implementation is not able to adequately protect the 
secret key under either measurement type. This indicates that simply varying the 
architecture of primitives is not sufficient to protect an implementation from SCA. 
 
 
Confidence Level 
Model 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9999 
EMHW 16 16 16 15 
EMHD 16 16 16 13 
POWHW 16 13 1 0 
POWHD 16 16 16 16 
 
4.2 Effects of High-Level Architecture Variation 
 This section compares the GAL-LUT standard configuration with a more complex 
GAL-LUT combined decryption/encryption implementation. Bit- and byte-level analyses 
are performed to determine if there are significant differences between the two 
implementations. All leakage models and measurement types are used in these analyses. 
 Table 4.7 lists the power HD analysis minimum, maximum, and mean maximum 
correlation coefficients across each configuration under the bit analysis. The other tables 
are listed in Appendix A. Figure 4.16 is the average case. Under this type of analysis, the 
combined configuration provides only slightly better correlation values across each 
primitive. All other types of analyses appear to only provide negligible differences in 
each stage. The best case for the EM HW model is greatly reduced in the SB stage and 
SR stages with the combined type, but increases the maximum leakage in both the ARK 
and MC stages (Figure 4.17). 
Table 4.6: Number of Exploitable Bytes per Confidence Level  
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Bits Power HD Architecture     
    C-LUT     GAL-LUT   
 Stage Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001445 0.005842 0.003273 0.001552 0.006953 0.003501 
SB 0.00118 0.004302 0.002415 0.001321 0.004812 0.002525 
SR 0.00118 0.004302 0.002415 0.001321 0.004812 0.002525 
MC 0.001879 0.005606 0.00335 0.001934 0.006954 0.003584 
 
 
  
Similar trends appear in the byte-level analysis. Figure 4.18 shows the byte-level 
power HD analysis for the average case. The combined style reduces correlations by 10-
25% depending on the stage. Other models and measurement types do not show 
significant differences. This means that the additional hardware components likely add 
noise only to the power measurements; EM is largely unaffected due to its localized 
nature. 
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Table 4.8 details the differences between the two high-level architectures for each 
of the primitives between the EM HW and power HD models at both the bit and byte 
levels. At both levels under the power HD model there is a high likelihood that the means 
for all three primitives are different between the GAL-LUT and combined architectures. 
The EM HW analysis does not follow the same trend, however, and none of the stages 
have statistically significant differences within 99% confidence. 
 
Bit EM HW Power HD 
 
Byte EM HW Power HD 
ARK -1.110E-04* 4.354E-04 
 
ARK -5.235E-04* 1.167E-03 
SB 1.970E-04* 1.201E-04* 
 
SB 9.150E-04* 1.205E-03 
MC -2.271E-04* 4.678E-04 
 
MC -6.192E-04* 1.214E-03 
*- Not statistically significant within 99% confidence interval 
Using a combined encryption/decryption architecture has been shown to be 
beneficial for limiting leakages under the power HD model, but has little effect on other 
analysis and measurement types. Table 4.9 shows the number of bits and bytes that can 
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be compromised at a given confidence level, again using the assumption that a high 
correlation coefficient can alone be used to exploit individual bits and bytes. The impact 
of the combined implementation can be seen in the bits for the power HD analysis, 
reducing the number of exploitable bits from 33 to 7 under the highest confidence level. 
Unfortunately it had no effect on the EM HW model, so 32 bits can still be compromised. 
The combined style did not affect the byte-level correlations enough to reduce the 
number of exploitable bytes, so the implementation is still quite weak to SCA at the byte 
level.  
 
Bit Confidence Level 
 
Byte Confidence Level 
 Model 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9999    Model 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9999 
EM HW 128 127 77 32   EM HW 16 16 16 15 
EM HD 128 116 9 0   EM HD 16 16 16 15 
Power HW 128 99 1 0   Power HW 16 16 0 0 
Power HD 128 128 70 7   Power HD 16 16 16 16 
 
4.3 Conclusions & Reasoning 
  Galois field calculation showed reduced leakage in many of the analyses. This is 
opposite of the initial hypothesis that the LUT variants would leak less information due to 
less data-dependent operations. This may occur because each of the LUT variants execute 
in constant time regardless of the input data, meaning that the target register is 
overwritten during the same time sample each time. This would lead to higher 
correlations at that one sample, or any other immediately surrounding samples. The 
composite field arithmetic process uses an asynchronous calculation method that may 
overwrite the target register in varying time samples. This means that the information 
Table 4.9: Combined EN/DE Exploitable Bits and Bytes 
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leakage is spread across a range of samples, rather than highly focused in a single or 
much smaller range of samples. This is supported by the general research into 
asynchronous or random clocking [FMP03]. 
 This can be investigated with the current leakage maps by examining the samples 
immediately surrounding the highest points of information leakage. In a LUT variant 
(Figure 4.19), a single point of high correlation is visible with limited additional 
correlation within 20 samples on either side of the main spike. In an equivalent GAL 
variant (Figure 4.20), the relatively high correlations can be seen within 30 samples of the 
central spike. In addition, the spike’s highest correlations are spread across 10 samples, 
whereas the spike spans only 3 samples in the LUT variant. A direct comparison between 
the two is shown in Figure 4.21. This loosely supports the theory of asynchronous 
clocking distributing the register writing times, however other experiments should be 
conducted to investigate this further. 
 
 
Varying the architecture of the MC primitive showed mixed results in many of the 
different analysis types. Using Galois multiplication resulted in higher correlations for 
most stages in the average case, however it lowered the maximum correlation in the best 
Figure 4.19: LUT-LUT Configuration 
Round 6 SB  
Figure 4.20: GAL-LUT Configuration 
Round 6 SB  
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case. This variation was less significant than the variation seen from changing the SB 
primitive, often resulting in a difference of less than 10% between the LUT alternative. 
This could be due to the fact that a reduced form of the MC operation was used which 
required only a single multiplication. It is possible that other functionally equivalent but 
more complex MC primitives would show more consistent effects on the information 
leakage. 
 
 
 Varying the high-level architecture had a significant effect on the observed 
correlations under the power HD analysis. The combined encryption/decryption 
implementation was expected to add additional noise to the system by processing 
additional information simultaneously along the decryption datapath, however this 
additional noise had a negligible impact on the magnitude of correlations for most the 
measurement types and leakage models. The more complex architecture was successful 
Figure 4.21: Round 6 SB Correlation Comparison  
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in limiting the number of exploited bits that showed high correlations in the power HD 
model, but did not affect the EM HW model. This means that the implementation as a 
whole is still weak, but provides some evidence that varying the high-level architecture 
can affect information leakage. Additional types of high-level architectures must be 
tested to gain a better understanding of their impact. Both types of high-level 
architectures tested used a fully-unrolled pipelined approach; an iterative or partially-
unrolled pipeline may have a different impact on the results. 
4.4 Summary 
 Across both the bit and byte levels, composite field arithmetic calculation used in 
the SB primitive resulted in reduced leakage in each analysis method. Varying the MC 
architecture had a limited effect on the information leakage, but other architecture types 
can potentially lead to more effective leakage reduction. Each architecture shows at least 
weak correlations, however the average cases were improved in GAL SB configurations. 
Some bits and bytes are still highly exploitable based off of the level of correlation at 
different stages, however the most direct points of attack do not have exceptionally high 
leakage. Varying the high-level architecture showed limited impact on only one of the 
analysis types, and did not have a significant effect on the correlations of other analyses. 
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V. Conclusions and Future Work 
 The analysis in Chapter 4 shows that different primitive architectures do in fact 
affect the information leakage of a cryptosystem. In particular, composite field arithmetic 
calculation of the SB stage is effective in reducing the overall leakage across each 
measurement type and leakage model. Varying the MC primitive between LUT and 
Galois multiplication variants also affected the information leakage. However, 
assessment of whether or not this variation reduced or added to leakages was 
inconclusive. The best practice lesson from this analysis is that LUT-based SB stages will 
probably leak more information than a direct calculation alternative. Other MC types 
must be tested and explored to find a style that is more effective at reducing leakage 
across each of the analysis types. 
 The exact reasoning for the differences in information leakage is unclear, but 
leakage map inspection supports the theory that wider temporal distribution of the 
register write times is related to the lower leakage levels. Due to inconsistent circuit 
timings and internal asynchronous signaling, the final result for a given stage is written at 
varying times within a normal distribution. These experiments were not designed to test 
this hypothesis however, and other experiments must be conducted to explore this 
problem in greater depth. 
 Across every type of analysis and level, the ARK and MC stages exhibited the 
highest correlations of the primitives. The maximum correlation coefficients for the SB 
and SR stages were often a third less than the observed maximum correlations for ARK 
or MC. The experiments provided evidence that changing primitive structures can affect 
the amount of information leaked by that primitive, so it is possible that alternate 
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implementations of ARK and untested MC styles can lead to lower information leakage 
in those primitives. 
 All tested configurations exhibited at least weak correlation, meaning that the 
device was potentially exploitable through correlation attacks. Significant variation in 
correlation coefficients was observed by changing some of the primitives, which suggests 
that other primitive architectures can also affect the observed leakage. The experimental 
methodology presented in this document can be extended to other types of primitives, 
such as a T-Box architecture or other unique SB and MC styles. 
 Attacks on the key schedule were not explored in this research, but these are a 
potential threat to many types of systems. As with the primitives, a number of different 
processes exist to calculate the individual round keys. These other options need to be 
explored to form a broader scope of knowledge with regard to best practice in 
constructing secure AES implementations. 
 Beyond the primitive architectures, varying the high-level system structure also 
showed some effect on information leakage. While not consistent across all leakage 
models and measurement types, the additional noise from the complex combined 
encryption/decryption architecture reduced the correlation coefficients of the power HD 
model. This is not sufficient to claim an increase in general SCA resistance, but it does 
mean that it is possible to fine-tune the development of some cryptosystems to resist 
specific types of SCA. Additional high-level architectures, such as iterative and partially-
unrolled pipelines, must be tested to determine how they affect a wide number of leakage 
models and measurement types. 
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 Other leakage models may more accurately capture intermediate operations than 
those used in this research. The effectiveness of these and other configurations at limiting 
information leakage is entirely dependent on the leakage model’s ability to capture 
leakage. The two leakage models tested in this research showed different results for all of 
the architectures and measurement types; some were far more effective than others at 
correlating the observed information to the hypotheses. Other leakage models will have 
to be researched and applied to this methodology to be able to truly assert any level of 
resistance. 
 Among the configurations tested, none were able to assert complete resistance to 
SCA attacks, and some bits and bytes were always susceptible to attack. However, the 
results show that it is possible for other untested configurations to achieve full resistance 
at this level of testing. This means that proper secure hardware design practices could 
potentially act as a countermeasure by itself.  This would reduce the necessary resources 
and development times to create secure cryptosystems with enough breadth and 
understanding. Further research with this methodology could be very beneficial in this 
manner, but it also has the possibility of failing to reduce correlations low enough to act 
as a countermeasure.
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Appendix A: Bit Maximum Leakage Tables 
 
Bits EM HD Arch                   
    LUT-LUT     LUT-GAL     GAL-LUT     GAL-GAL   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001553 0.00617 0.002822 0.001506 0.005051 0.002737 0.001458 0.004843 0.002658 0.001384 0.004999 0.002681 
SB 0.001432 0.004605 0.002738 0.001699 0.004692 0.002733 0.001428 0.004609 0.002525 0.001392 0.004469 0.002571 
SR 0.001432 0.004605 0.002738 0.001699 0.004692 0.002733 0.001428 0.004609 0.002525 0.001392 0.004469 0.002571 
MC 0.001555 0.00617 0.002819 0.001506 0.005051 0.002718 0.00146 0.004843 0.002646 0.001384 0.004999 0.002673 
 
Bits POW HD Arch                   
    LUT-LUT     LUT-GAL     GAL-LUT     GAL-GAL   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001449 0.008862 0.003861 0.001248 0.007425 0.003504 0.001552 0.006953 0.003501 0.001614 0.007496 0.003356 
SB 0.001484 0.008199 0.003195 0.001493 0.008347 0.003329 0.001321 0.004812 0.002525 0.00132 0.004646 0.002594 
SR 0.001484 0.008199 0.003195 0.001493 0.008347 0.003329 0.001321 0.004812 0.002525 0.00132 0.004646 0.002594 
MC 0.001449 0.008855 0.00372 0.001248 0.007425 0.003294 0.001934 0.006954 0.003584 0.001618 0.007493 0.003441 
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Bits EM HW Arch                   
    LUT-LUT     LUT-GAL     GAL-LUT     GAL-GAL   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001654 0.017201 0.003201 0.001465 0.016425 0.003407 0.001269 0.009419 0.002793 0.00133 0.008508 0.002734 
SB 0.001551 0.017201 0.002934 0.00158 0.01324 0.002824 0.00144 0.009113 0.00263 0.001403 0.009259 0.002729 
SR 0.001551 0.017201 0.002934 0.00158 0.01324 0.002824 0.00144 0.009113 0.00263 0.001403 0.009259 0.002729 
MC 0.001654 0.015321 0.002987 0.001465 0.015342 0.003085 0.001269 0.009419 0.002772 0.00133 0.008508 0.002747 
 
 
Bits POW HW Arch                   
    LUT-LUT     LUT-GAL     GAL-LUT     GAL-GAL   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001074 0.004358 0.002349 0.000993 0.004467 0.002272 0.001186 0.004365 0.002373 0.001158 0.004422 0.002351 
SB 0.001074 0.00441 0.002341 0.001079 0.004509 0.00224 0.000993 0.004189 0.002345 0.001161 0.004053 0.00232 
SR 0.001074 0.00441 0.002341 0.001079 0.004509 0.00224 0.000993 0.004189 0.002345 0.001161 0.004053 0.00232 
MC 0.001265 0.004358 0.002354 0.000993 0.004393 0.002268 0.001186 0.004365 0.002387 0.001158 0.004422 0.00237 
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Bits EM HD Arch       
    C-LUT     GAL-LUT   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001554 0.005122 0.002682 0.001458 0.004843 0.002658 
SB 0.001416 0.004554 0.002485 0.001428 0.004609 0.002525 
SR 0.001416 0.004554 0.002485 0.001428 0.004609 0.002525 
MC 0.00155 0.005122 0.002679 0.00146 0.004843 0.002646 
 
 
Bits POW HD Arch       
    C-LUT     GAL-LUT   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001445 0.005842 0.003273 0.001552 0.006953 0.003501 
SB 0.00118 0.004302 0.002415 0.001321 0.004812 0.002525 
SR 0.00118 0.004302 0.002415 0.001321 0.004812 0.002525 
MC 0.001879 0.005606 0.00335 0.001934 0.006954 0.003584 
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Bits EM HW Arch       
    C-LUT     GAL-LUT   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001442 0.010957 0.002783 0.001269 0.009419 0.002793 
SB 0.0013 0.005282 0.002561 0.00144 0.009113 0.00263 
SR 0.0013 0.005282 0.002561 0.00144 0.009113 0.00263 
MC 0.001503 0.010957 0.002852 0.001269 0.009419 0.002772 
 
 
Bits POW HW Arch       
    C-LUT     GAL-LUT   
  Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001143 0.004488 0.002403 0.001186 0.004365 0.002373 
SB 0.00118 0.004182 0.002385 0.000993 0.004189 0.002345 
SR 0.00118 0.004182 0.002385 0.000993 0.004189 0.002345 
MC 0.001143 0.004488 0.002418 0.001186 0.004365 0.002387 
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Appendix B: Byte Maximum Leakage Tables 
 
Bytes EM HD Arch 
         
  
LL 
  
LG 
  
GL 
  
GG 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001979 0.00847 0.003819 0.001961 0.007278 0.003626 0.001763 0.007829 0.004063 0.002095 0.007032 0.004095 
SB 0.001804 0.005485 0.003308 0.002071 0.006244 0.003524 0.001505 0.004559 0.002694 0.001586 0.005586 0.002939 
SR 0.001804 0.005485 0.003308 0.002071 0.006244 0.003524 0.001505 0.004559 0.002694 0.001586 0.005586 0.002939 
MC 0.001979 0.00847 0.003723 0.001961 0.006747 0.003563 0.00244 0.006134 0.004005 0.002303 0.005956 0.004104 
 
 
Bytes POW HD Arch 
         
  
LL 
  
LG 
  
GL 
  
GG 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.002167 0.020894 0.008945 0.002312 0.016098 0.007664 0.003834 0.012391 0.007732 0.003332 0.011065 0.007228 
SB 0.003683 0.015104 0.006722 0.004138 0.012012 0.007474 0.001957 0.006375 0.003689 0.00246 0.006507 0.004132 
SR 0.003683 0.015104 0.006722 0.004138 0.012012 0.007474 0.001957 0.006375 0.003689 0.00246 0.006507 0.004132 
MC 0.002167 0.020902 0.008434 0.002301 0.015241 0.006884 0.005698 0.012391 0.007946 0.005007 0.011065 0.007492 
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Bytes EM HW Arch 
         
  
LL 
  
LG 
  
GL 
  
GG 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001987 0.018897 0.003753 0.001715 0.016486 0.004056 0.001546 0.013521 0.003143 0.001385 0.008796 0.002999 
SB 0.001762 0.01053 0.003168 0.00162 0.010996 0.002922 0.001503 0.009685 0.002971 0.001637 0.009438 0.003254 
SR 0.001762 0.01053 0.003168 0.00162 0.010996 0.002922 0.001503 0.009685 0.002971 0.001637 0.009438 0.003254 
MC 0.001564 0.01111 0.00322 0.00175 0.012533 0.00358 0.001625 0.010211 0.002835 0.001627 0.006362 0.002735 
 
 
Bytes POW HW Arch 
         
  
LL 
  
LG 
  
GL 
  
GG 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.00141 0.00394 0.002326 0.001422 0.00395 0.00227 0.001219 0.004597 0.002322 0.001374 0.004182 0.002293 
SB 0.001522 0.003478 0.002354 0.001332 0.003642 0.002279 0.001266 0.003927 0.002397 0.001353 0.003889 0.002378 
SR 0.001522 0.003478 0.002354 0.001332 0.003642 0.002279 0.001266 0.003927 0.002397 0.001353 0.003889 0.002378 
MC 0.001249 0.003789 0.002349 0.001182 0.003851 0.002298 0.001431 0.003802 0.002403 0.001296 0.003421 0.002358 
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Bytes EM HD Arch 
   
  
CL 
  
GL 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001746 0.007691 0.004329 0.001763 0.007829 0.004063 
SB 0.001375 0.004103 0.002498 0.001505 0.004559 0.002694 
SR 0.001375 0.004103 0.002498 0.001505 0.004559 0.002694 
MC 0.002247 0.007295 0.004277 0.00244 0.006134 0.004005 
 
 
 
Bytes POW HD Arch 
   
  
CL 
  
GL 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.002943 0.009989 0.006785 0.003834 0.012391 0.007732 
SB 0.001225 0.00475 0.00258 0.001957 0.006375 0.003689 
SR 0.001225 0.00475 0.00258 0.001957 0.006375 0.003689 
MC 0.004678 0.009992 0.007064 0.005698 0.012391 0.007946 
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Bytes EM HW Arch 
   
  
CL 
  
GL 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001571 0.013847 0.003392 0.001546 0.013521 0.003143 
SB 0.001344 0.007885 0.002804 0.001503 0.009685 0.002971 
SR 0.001344 0.007885 0.002804 0.001503 0.009685 0.002971 
MC 0.001611 0.010275 0.003018 0.001625 0.010211 0.002835 
 
 
 
Bytes POW HW Arch 
   
  
CL 
  
GL 
 
 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ARK 0.001394 0.004369 0.002372 0.001219 0.004597 0.002322 
SB 0.001403 0.004184 0.00247 0.001266 0.003927 0.002397 
SR 0.001403 0.004184 0.00247 0.001266 0.003927 0.002397 
MC 0.001454 0.003413 0.002385 0.001431 0.003802 0.002403 
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Appendix C: Byte First and Last Round Tables 
Byte EM HD   Arch         
  LL   LG   GL   GG   
  Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 
ARK 0.004741 0.003759 0.005033 0.002787 0.005753 0.002887 0.005254 0.002864 
SB 0.002898 0.00376 0.003156 0.002787 0.002791 0.002887 0.003061 0.002864 
SR 0.002898 0.00376 0.003156 0.002787 0.002791 0.002887 0.003061 0.002864 
MC 0.00319   0.003324   0.003839   0.004164   
 
 
Byte POW HD   Arch         
  LL   LG   GL   GG   
  Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 
ARK 0.011534 0.010959 0.012014 0.010337 0.008605 0.004929 0.007608 0.004473 
SB 0.005886 0.010961 0.006266 0.010338 0.003628 0.00493 0.003836 0.004473 
SR 0.005886 0.010961 0.006266 0.010338 0.003628 0.00493 0.003836 0.004473 
MC 0.007251   0.006796   0.007563   0.007601   
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Byte EM HW   Arch         
  LL   LG   GL   GG   
  Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 
ARK 0.004744 0.00576 0.00553 0.007427 0.003133 0.002688 0.002542 0.002515 
SB 0.002649 0.004437 0.002926 0.003687 0.00266 0.003276 0.002859 0.002654 
SR 0.002649 0.004437 0.002926 0.003687 0.00266 0.003276 0.002859 0.002654 
MC 0.002763   0.004055   0.002644   0.002499   
 
 
Byte POW HW   Arch         
  LL   LG   GL   GG   
  Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 Round 1 Round 10 
ARK 0.002365 0.002171 0.002164 0.002123 0.002097 0.002294 0.002117 0.002172 
SB 0.002388 0.002343 0.002428 0.002221 0.002406 0.00232 0.002403 0.002253 
SR 0.002388 0.002343 0.002428 0.002221 0.002406 0.00232 0.002403 0.002253 
MC 0.002128   0.002144   0.00224   0.002092   
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Appendix D: t-Test p-Value Tables 
 
Bits ARK EMHW     
 
Bits ARK POWHD     
  LL LG GL GG 
 
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 0.016889039 2.46E-08 6.90723E-12 
 
LL x 0.017791 0.000290413 1.02477E-06 
LG 0.016889039 x 1.54E-17 3.43142E-22 
 
LG 0.017791 x 0.143911576 0.000918902 
GL 2.46044E-08 1.53832E-17 x 0.005852759 
 
GL 0.00029 0.143912 x 0.013386391 
GG 6.90723E-12 3.43142E-22 0.005853 x 
 
GG 1.02E-06 0.000919 0.013386391 x 
           Bits SB EMHW     
 
Bits SB POWHD     
  LL LG GL GG 
 
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 0.167275232 1.88E-06 0.000480166 
 
LL x 0.683709 4.74946E-36 1.40721E-32 
LG 0.167275232 x 1.83E-05 0.011074805 
 
LG 0.683709 x 1.55371E-30 2.25172E-27 
GL 1.88089E-06 1.83206E-05 x 0.007642919 
 
GL 4.75E-36 1.55E-30 x 0.048924795 
GG 0.000480166 0.011074805 0.007643 x 
 
GG 1.41E-32 2.25E-27 0.048924795 x 
           Bits MC EMHW     
 
Bits MC POWHD     
  LL LG GL GG 
 
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 0.551662128 4.47E-05 1.01142E-08 
 
LL x 0.001494 0.443079823 0.04527418 
LG 0.551662128 x 2.78E-06 3.49069E-10 
 
LG 0.001494 x 9.87972E-05 0.022443616 
GL 4.47494E-05 2.78443E-06 x 0.01382771 
 
GL 0.44308 9.88E-05 x 0.009414969 
GG 1.01142E-08 3.49069E-10 0.013828 x 
 
GG 0.045274 0.022444 0.009414969 x 
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 Bytes ARK EMHW     
 
Bytes ARK POWHD     
  LL LG GL GG 
 
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 0.351728935 0.039057 0.004812 
 
LL x 0.309985 0.004081 0.001705 
LG 0.351729 x 0.000701 2.72E-05 
 
LG 0.309985 x 0.00123 0.000215 
GL 0.039057 0.000701009 x 0.220598 
 
GL 0.004081 0.00123 x 0.223594 
GG 0.004812 2.72333E-05 0.220598 x 
 
GG 0.001705 0.000215 0.223594 x 
  
   
  
 
  
   
  
 Bytes SB EMHW     
 
Bytes SB POWHD     
  LL LG GL GG 
 
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 0.55304918 0.68645 0.889858 
 
LL x 0.456595 1.87E-10 4.39E-10 
LG 0.553049 x 0.79032 0.425819 
 
LG 0.456595 x 1.86E-16 7.59E-16 
GL 0.68645 0.790319885 x 0.52731 
 
GL 1.87E-10 1.86E-16 x 0.190812 
GG 0.889858 0.425818619 0.52731 x 
 
GG 4.39E-10 7.59E-16 0.190812 x 
  
   
  
 
  
   
  
 Bytes MC EMHW     
 
Bytes MC POWHD     
  LL LG GL GG 
 
  LL LG GL GG 
LL x 0.233574823 0.113307 0.029084 
 
LL x 0.184365 0.331222 0.231752 
LG 0.233575 x 0.00514 0.000613 
 
LG 0.184365 x 0.380402 0.581512 
GL 0.113307 0.005140277 x 0.611725 
 
GL 0.331222 0.380402 x 0.295397 
GG 0.029084 0.000612503 0.611725 x 
 
GG 0.231752 0.581512 0.295397 x 
 
 
 
76 
 
Combined-LUT vs GAL-LUT 
Bit EM POW 
 
Byte EM POW 
ARK 0.4874125 1.29E-08 
 
ARK 0.560026 0.001042 
SB 0.0238987 0.023903 
 
SB 0.108607 4.11E-07 
MC 0.1583897 1.37E-09 
 
MC 0.412668 0.001032 
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